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I. SUMMARY OF THIS ANSWER 
The Brief Of Amicus Curiae Washington’s Paramount Duty 
(“Paramount Duty Brief”) argues in favor of this Court continuing to 
retain jurisdiction in this McCleary suit.  This is plaintiffs’ Answer. 
The Paramount Duty Brief presents its first argument under the 
heading: “There Is Already Evidence That The State’s New Funding 
Scheme Falls Far Short Of Resolving The State’s Ongoing Violations Of 
The Article 9, §1, Rights Of Our State’s Public School Children”.   
Plaintiffs’ answer can be summarized in two points:  
 Facts On The Ground.  The Paramount Duty Brief’s factual 
premise is correct.  If this were a trial court proceeding with 
sworn witness testimony about school district experience under 
the new State program funding levels, the admissible evidence 
would show the State is still failing to provide the ample State 
funding required by Article IX, section 1.  [Part II.A.1 below.] 
 Proving Those Facts.  But this is not a trial court proceeding 
with sworn testimony about the State’s new funding formulas.  
It’s an appellate proceeding whose evidentiary record 
addressed the State’s prior formulas at the time of trial.  
Plaintiffs accordingly recognize that clearing the way for 
expedited trial court proceedings to examine school district 
experience under the new State funding levels is an alternative 
to this Court’s continuing to retain appellate jurisdiction in this 
appeal.  [Part II.A.2 below.] 
The Paramount Duty Brief presents its second argument under the 
heading:  “This Court’s Independent Duties Under Article 9, §1 Exceed Its 
Article 4 Duties And Support Continuing Jurisdiction And Oversight”.   
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Plaintiffs’ answer to this second argument can also be summarized 
in two points: 
 Judicial Branch Duty.  The Paramount Duty Brief’s legal 
premise is correct.  Article IX, section 1 expressly imposes its 
duty on “the State” – which includes all three branches 
(legislative, executive, and judicial).  The judicial branch’s 
duty under Article IX, section 1 to uphold every Washington 
child’s constitutional right to an amply funded education is 
independent of the judicial branch’s more generalized 
assignment under Article IV.  [Part II.B.1 below.] 
 Exercising That Duty.  The Supreme Court’s continuing to 
retain jurisdiction in the McCleary case is not the only way for 
the judicial branch to exercise its Article IX, section 1 duty to 
uphold Washington children’s constitutional right to an amply 
funded education with respect to the State’s new program 
funding levels.  Plaintiffs accordingly recognize that the 
judicial branch can exercise its Article IX, section 1 duty by 
expediting trial court proceedings that address school district 
experience with the State’s new funding formulas, and granting 
prompt appellate oversight when appropriate.  [Part II.B.2 
below.] 
 
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 
A. Paramount Duty’s Argument That “The State’s New Funding 
Scheme Falls Far Short” 
The Paramount Duty Brief’s first argument is that this Court 
should retain jurisdiction because evidence already exists to show the 
 
- 3 - 
53043743.7 
State’s new funding scheme falls short of providing the ample funding for 
all children mandated by Article IX, section 1.1 
1. Facts Today. 
With respect to facts, plaintiffs agree that evidence of the new 
funding formulas’ unconstitutional underfunding already exists in our 
State’s public schools.  But that evidence is not in this suit’s appellate 
record because this suit’s 2009 trial examined Washington school 
districts’ experience with the State’s prior funding formulas back then – 
not the State’s new funding formulas today.2 
                                                 
1 Paramount Duty Brief at 1-9 (argument under heading C.1, entitled “There Is 
Already Evidence That The State’s New Funding Scheme Falls Far Short Of Resolving 
The State’s Ongoing Violations Of The Article 9, §1, Rights Of Our State’s Public School 
Children”).  This Court’s rulings confirming the ample funding right conferred on each 
and every Washington child by Article IX, section 1 is summarized in, e.g., Plaintiffs’ 
2016 Post-Budget Filing at 6-12; see also Plaintiffs’ 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 2-4. 
2 The parties’ prior briefing in this appellate proceeding (the State’s appeal from the 
2010 Final Judgment) accordingly could not cite any evidence from the trial court record 
to prove that the State’s new program funding formulas do or do not in fact amply fund 
the State’s basic education program.  Instead, the State Attorney General’s briefing 
alleged that the legislature thinks its new formulas do provide the constitutionally 
required ample funding, and plaintiffs’ briefing noted examples of how the new formulas 
on their face leave funding gaps.  See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at 15-17 
(noting types of salary funding gaps), at 20-21 (teacher shortage/retention issues), 
at 23-24 (outdated basis & inapplicable statewide averages for pupil transportation), 
at 24 (outdated basis & inapplicable statewide averages for MSOCs), & at 25 (highly 
capable); accord, Plaintiffs’ 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 24-40 (noting gaps on the face 
of the new funding formulas, but without any citation to gaps in application since the new 
formulas did not exist at the time of trial).  Given the trial court record’s lack of evidence 
to prove whether the State’s new program funding formulas are or are not in fact 
constitutionally adequate to amply fund the State’s basic education program, this Court’s 
November 2017 Order concluded that “At this point, the court is willing to allow the 
State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves 
adequate.”  11/15/2017 McCleary Order at 37.   
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Also with respect to facts, plaintiffs are confident that State 
officials who have the evidentiary foundation and personal knowledge 
required for admissible court testimony would (if required to testify in a 
trial court proceeding under oath) have to truthfully admit that the State’s 
new funding formulas do not provide ample funding for the basic 
education of all children in our State’s K-12 public schools.    
2. Appellate Procedure. 
With respect to appellate procedure, however, plaintiffs 
acknowledge that it is ordinarily the role of trial courts to conduct trials.  
Not appellate courts.  Plaintiffs accordingly recognize that this Court may 
therefore conclude that proving a new State formula’s failure to provide 
the ample funding required by Article IX, section 1 should await trial 
court litigation with sworn testimony and admissible evidence about 
school district experience under that new formula.   
3. Plaintiffs’ Conclusion Regarding The First Argument. 
Plaintiffs are confident that, as a matter of fact, trial court evidence 
will prove the new State funding formulas violate Article IX, section 1’s 
ample funding mandate.   
But as a matter of appellate procedure, plaintiffs recognize that this 
Court may leave it to future trial court proceedings to prove this fact.  If 
this Court does not retain jurisdiction as the Paramount Duty Brief 
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requests, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court’s ruling make it 
unequivocally clear to trial courts that they must resolve such proceedings 
promptly – for time truly is of the essence when it comes to any individual 
child’s education.   
B. Paramount Duty’s Argument That This Court Has 
“Independent Duties Under Article IX, Section 1” 
The Paramount Duty Brief’s second argument is that this Court 
should continue its retention of jurisdiction and oversight because this 
Court has an independent duty under Article IX, section 1 to protect 
Washington children’s constitutional right to an amply funded education 
from infringement by the other branches of State government.3 
1. Judicial Branch Duty. 
With respect to the judicial branch’s duty, plaintiffs agree that the 
judicial branch itself has a constitutional duty under Article IX, section 1 
that is distinct from the judicial branch’s generalized assignment under 
Article IV.   
This Court has long recognized that Article IX, section 1 expressly 
imposes its duty on “the State” – which embraces all three branches of 
                                                 
3 Paramount Duty Brief at 9-15 (argument under heading C.2, entitled “This Court’s 
Independent Duties Under Article 9, §1 Exceed Its Article 4 Duties And Support 
Continuing Jurisdiction And Oversight”). 
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State government:  legislative, executive, and judicial.4  This Court has 
therefore long recognized that the constitutional command of Article IX, 
section 1 makes it the express duty of the State’s judicial branch to uphold 
and protect Washington children’s judicially enforceable, constitutional 
right to an amply funded education.5   
With respect to the judicial branch’s duty, plaintiffs also agree the 
separation of powers doctrine implied (but not stated) in the Washington 
constitution does not protect other branches from the judicial branch 
exercising its Article IX, section 1 duty to uphold and protect Washington 
children’s constitutional right to an amply funded education.  Indeed, the 
very reason powers are dispersed between separate branches is to protect 
Washington residents from the State government violating their 
constitutional rights – not to protect the government branch that’s 
violating those constitutional rights.  As prior briefing in this case has 
repeatedly confirmed, this underlying purpose requires a separation of the 
                                                 
4 Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 512, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (by imposing 
its paramount duty on “the State”, Article IX, section 1 applies to all three branches of 
government – legislative, executive, and judicial.  Thus, “Article IX, section 1 is a 
mandate, not to a single branch of government, but to the entire state.”); McCleary v. 
State, 173 Wn.2d 477, 515, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (same).      
5 Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wn.2d at 520 (1978) (“article IX, section 1 
imposes a judicially enforceable affirmative duty on the State to make ample provision 
for the education of all children”);  McCleary v. State, 173 Wn.2d at 515 (2012) (“More 
than 30 years ago, we held that article IX, section 1 imposes a judicially enforceable 
affirmative duty on the State to make ample provision for the education of all children.”),  
at 541 (“We will not abdicate our judicial role.”), & at 544 (“As a coequal branch of 
state government we cannot ignore our constitutional responsibility to ensure compliance 
with article IX, section 1.”).     
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judicial branch’s powers from the two other branches – not an elimination 
of the judicial branch’s power to enforce a constitutional right when 
another branch violates that right.6    
                                                 
6 Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at 39-48 (explaining how powers are separated 
to stop government violations of constitutional rights – not shelter violations, and citing 
Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 484 (Ark. 2002), cert. 
denied, 538 U.S. 1035 (2003); McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 515, 544 & 546; Columbia Falls 
Elementary School District No. 6 v. Montana, 109 P.3d 257, 261 (Mont. 2005); Montoy 
v. Kansas, 112 P.3d 923, 930-931 (Kan. 2005); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18, 78 S.Ct. 
1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958); Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 281, 301-02, 110 S.Ct. 
625, 107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457, 
459 (N.J. 1976);  Plaintiffs’ 2014 Post-Budget Filing at 38-42 (discussing the same);  
Plaintiffs’ 2014 Answer To The Amicus Brief Of Mr. Eugster at 2-7 (noting lack of 
authority for invoking separation of powers to protect unconstitutional activities like the 
government’s violation of constitutional rights, or for claiming that separation of powers 
grants each branch the prerogative to violate constitutional rights when it’s convenient, 
and concluding that “separation of powers ensures the judicial branch exists as a 
separate and independent branch with the power to stop another branch’s allowing State 
government to violate constitutional rights.  That’s why it’s called separation of powers – 
not elimination of powers.”) (footnote omitted);  Plaintiffs’ 2014 Answer To 
Defendant’s Response To The Court’s Show Cause Order at 1-3 (explaining how 
“separation of powers ensures the judicial branch has the authority to stop the 
government’s violation of constitutional rights when other branches do not.  Separation 
of powers creates an independent judiciary – not an irrelevant one.”) and at 9-10 
(explaining that “Powers Are Separated To Stop Government Violations Of 
Constitutional Rights – Not To Grant The Legislative Branch Immunity To Perpetuate 
Them”, and that “Separation of powers therefore assures citizens’ constitutional rights 
the protection of an independent judiciary – not the empty words of an irrelevant one.”);  
Plaintiffs’ 2015 Answer To The Amicus Brief Of Mr. Eugster at 3-5 (discussing courts 
enforcing the constitutional right of children to a desegregated public education after 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), reversing 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896), and Brown v. 
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955);  Plaintiffs’ 2016 
Post-Budget Filing at 44 & n.88;  Plaintiffs’ 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 48-49 
(summarizing why it’s a separation of powers, not an elimination of powers);  Plaintiffs’ 
2017 RAP 10.8 Statement Of Additional Authorities Relating To Yesterday’s Oral 
Argument at 3 (citing 9/28/2017 Pennsylvania Supreme Court school funding decision’s 
separation of powers ruling in William Penn School District v. Pennsylvania Dept. of 
Education, 170 A.3d 414, 418 (Pa. 2017) (“It is settled beyond peradventure that 
constitutional promises must be kept. Since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), it 
has been well-established that the separation of powers in our tripartite system of 
government typically depends upon judicial review to check acts or omissions by the 
other branches in derogation of constitutional requirements.”), & at 435-439 (“The 
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2. Exercising This Judicial Branch Duty. 
With respect to exercising this duty, however, plaintiffs 
acknowledge that the Court’s continuing to retain jurisdiction in this 
McCleary case is not the only way for the judicial branch to uphold and 
protect Washington children’s constitutional right to an amply funded 
education.  This Court’s November 2017 Order expressly declared that 
school district experience will be the judge of whether the State’s new 
program funding formulas prove adequate to comply with the ample 
funding mandate of Article IX, section 1.7  The judicial branch could 
accordingly exercise its constituional duty under Article IX, section 1 by 
expediting trial court proceedings that address school district experience 
with the State’s new funding formulas, and granting prompt appellate 
oversight when appropriate.  For example, expedited trial court 
proceedings with direct Supreme Court review when appropriate would 
promote the swift resolution of this long-festering school funding problem 
that dates back to the 1978 Seattle School District ruling – a year when 
                                                 
 
cornerstone of our republican democracy is the principle of government divided into 
three separate, co-equal branches that both empower and constrain one another. Judicial 
review stands as a bulwark against unconstitutional or otherwise illegal actions by the 
two political branches.”) (citations omitted)). 
7 November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to 
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves 
adequate.”). 
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Carter McCleary’s mother was the same age that his middle school sister 
Kelsey was when the McCleary and Venema families filed this suit.8 
3. Plaintiffs’ Conclusion Regarding The Second 
Argument. 
As a matter of law, the judicial branch has an independent legal 
duty under Article IX, section 1 to uphold and protect Washington 
children’s judicially enforceable, constitutional right to an amply funded 
education.   
But as a matter of application, plaintiffs recognize that this Court 
may conclude that the appropriate process is for the judicial branch to 
swiftly examine school district experience with the State’s new funding 
formulas at the trial court level, overseen with prompt appellate review 
when appropriate.  If this Court does not retain jurisdiction as the 
Paramount Duty Brief requests, plaintiffs respectfully request that this 
Court’s ruling make it unequivocally clear to trial courts that they must 
resolve such proceedings promptly, and assure Washington’s over 
1 million school children that this Court will grant prompt appellate 
review when appropriate.  For as noted earlier, time truly is of the essence 
when it comes to any individual child’s education.   
                                                 
8 February 2010 McCleary Final Judgment at ¶¶13-16 (CP 2876). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
A second grader doesn’t get a second chance at second grade.  
Plaintiff Carter McCleary was a second grader at Chimacum Creek 
Elementary School when his parents filed this suit to stop the State’s 
violation of their son’s constitutional right to an amply funded education.  
But the State successfully dragged this suit on past Carter’s graduation 
from high school last year.   
Some things do properly move at glacial speed.  For example, the 
27 glaciers on Mount Rainier.9  But other things should move swiftly.  
Like the judicial enforcement of a Washington child’s paramount 
constitutional right to an amply funded K-12 education.  Plaintiffs 
accordingly request that this Court’s upcoming Order make it 
unequivocally clear to all trial courts in our State that factual disputes 
concerning the constitutionality of the State’s current K-12 education 
funding scheme – including the funding shortfalls identified in the 
Paramount Duty Brief – must be expeditiously resolved.   
As the court filings in this case have been noting for over 11 years 
now, justice delayed is justice denied.10  Plaintiffs respectfully request that 
                                                 
9 https://www.nps.gov/mora/learn/kidsyouth/glaciers-for-kids.htm 
10 Plaintiffs’ January 2007 Complaint at ¶1 (CP 4 at lines 1 & 17-18) (“The simple 
fact remains...that justice delayed is justice denied”); Plaintiffs’ August 2017 
Post-Budget Filing at 16-17 (quoting Martin Luther King’s April 1961 letter from the 
Birmingham jail in response to the group of Alabama religious leaders who urged him to 
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this Court decline to hand State officials – be they in the legislative, 
executive, or judicial branch – any excuses or rationalizations for more 
time-consuming delays.  
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of May, 2018.  
Foster Pepper PLLC 
        s/ Thomas F. Ahearne                    . 
Thomas F. Ahearne, WSBA No. 14844 
Christopher G. Emch, WSBA No. 26457 
Adrian Urquhart Winder, WSBA No. 38071 
Kelly A. Mennemeier, WSBA No. 51838 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents McCleary 
Family, Venema Family, and Network for 
Excellence in Washington Schools (NEWS) 
                                                 
 
back off and be patient since civil rights progress was already being made in Alabama, 
explaining why he was not backing off and being patient: “Justice too long delayed is 
justice denied”, and citing Asarco Inc. v. Dept. of Ecology, 145 Wn.2d 750, 786, 43 P.3d 
471 (2002), amended on denial of reconsideration, 49 P.3d 128 (2002) (“Justice delayed 
is justice denied”); In re Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 695, 705, 72 P.3d 703 (2003) (“Our 
obligation is to dispense justice.  Justice delayed is often justice denied.”) (J. Chambers, 
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